87-284

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 17 1987
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

No. _____

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

THE STATE OF TEXAS, *Petitioner*

v.

RODNEY GENE BROADWAY, *Respondent*

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is the failure to observe the procedural guidelines of *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), subject to harmless error analysis, and, if so, what form should that analysis take?

2. If a *Pate* violation is established, may evidence of harmlessness be developed through events occurring after trial?

3. If respondent is entitled to relief, should it be limited to a retrospective competency hearing rather than a new trial?

4. Is respondent's post-conviction *Pate* complaint barred by the failure of his competent trial counsel to object at trial to the absence of a separate competency hearing?

LIST OF PARTIES

The only parties to the proceedings below were petitioner, The State of Texas, and respondent, Rodney Gene Broadway.

The Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County, Texas, is the proper legal representative of petitioner in this case. Respondent was convicted in district court in Tarrant County in 1966, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. *Broadway v. State*, 418 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). In late 1986 he filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus in the same district court, and the Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief in the form of a new trial. The petition seeks review of this latter judgment.

The Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County and his assistants represent the State of Texas in all criminal cases in the Tarrant County district courts, in appeals of those cases, and in all habeas corpus cases involving criminal proceedings. Tex. Const. Ann. art. V, § 21; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.01; Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 41.101-41.103. The Criminal District Attorney "shall represent Tarrant County in *any* court in which the county has pending business." Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 44.320(a) (emphasis added). Clearly the present petition amounts to pending business of Tarrant County: The prior work on respondent's trial, appeal, and habeas corpus petition has been done by the Criminal District Attorney through his assistants, all of whom have been employees of Tarrant County, and he and his assistants will also be responsible for the re-prosecution of respondent if the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals remains undisturbed. See also, *State v. Gary*, 359 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. 1962); *Sheppard v. Alaniz*, 303 S.W.2d 846, 848-850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957, no writ); *Baker v. Wade*, 769 F.2d 289, 291-292 (5th Cir. 1985) (opin. on reh.), *cert. denied*, 106 S.Ct. 3337 (1986).

Also, the Criminal District Attorney and his assistants have previously represented the State of Texas before this Court under similar circumstances. *Texas v. Brown*, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED i

LIST OF PARTIES ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v

OPINION BELOW 1

JURISDICTION 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2

1. How The Federal Questions Were Presented 3

2. Facts Pertinent to the Issue of Competency 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS HAS DECIDED THE FEDERAL QUESTION OF HARMLESS DUE PROCESS ERROR IN CONFLICT WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 8

A. The Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to acknowledge that the failure to hold a separate competency hearing may be harmless constitutional error 8

B. The Court should grant the petition to decide what factors are to be considered in determining harmless error under *Pate v. Robinson* 10

C. The petition should be granted to decide whether facts developed after trial can be utilized in the determination of harmless *Pate* error 12

D. The facts of respondent's case clearly demonstrate the application of the harmless error rule to the failure to hold a separate competency hearing 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

II. IN DECIDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL RATHER THAN A RETROSPECTIVE COMPETENCY HEARING, THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS DECIDED A FEDERAL QUESTION IN CONFLICT WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 17

III. THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE FEDERAL QUESTION OF WAIVER IN CONFLICT WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT..... 18

CONCLUSION..... 20

APPENDIX

Opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas A-1

Memorandum and Findings of Fact of the Trial Court..... A-3

Voluminous Statutory Material:

1. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated, art. 11.07, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1986)..... A-7

2. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated, art. 46.02, §§ 1-2 (Vernon 1966)..... A-9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Acosta v. Turner, 666 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1982) 9
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) 12

Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (opin. on reh.), *cert. denied*, 106 S.Ct. 3337 (1986) ii
Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956) 9
Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) 8
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 9
Broadway v. State, 418 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) ... ii, 3, 7
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) 11

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) 8, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) 8, 10, 11
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) 9
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) 5

Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (1986) 19
Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986) 9, 10, 17
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (1986) 11, 15
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) 9, 14, 15, 18
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) 9, 18

Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) 13
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) 9, 12
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) 9, 17, 18

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 5
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) 12

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) 18, 19, 20

Ex parte Locklin, 583 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) 5, 10, 17, 19

Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) 15, 21
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 11, 12
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) 21
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) 5
Morales v. State, 427 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) 5

New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Cases Page

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) ..... *passim*
Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491 (1985) 15

Rose v. Clark, 106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986) 8, 10, 12, 17
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) 8, 10, 11, 15, 17

Sandstrom v. Montana, 422 U.S. 510 (1979) 8
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) 10, 11, 13, 15
Sheppard v. Alaniz, 303 S.W.2d 846
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957, no writ) ii
State v. Bertrand, 465 A.2d 912 (N.H. 1983) 9
State v. Gary, 359 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1962) ii
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 19

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) ..... ii, 5, 19
Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) 5, 6, 9

United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) 10, 11, 13

Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S.Ct. 617 (1986) 4, 13

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ..... 2, 9
28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) 1, 7
Tex. Const. art. V, § 21 ii
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.01 (Vernon Supp. 1987) ii
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07
(Vernon Supp. 1986) 2, 3, 4, 5
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02 (Vernon 1966) 2, 6
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02
(Vernon 1979 and Supp. 1987) 6
Tex. Govt. Code § 41.101 ii
Tex. Govt. Code § 41.102 ii
Tex. Govt. Code § 41.103 ii
Tex. Govt. Code § 44.320(a) ii
Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 34 (Vernon Supp. 1966) 2, 9

Other

H. Monaghan, *Of "Liberty" and "Property,"* 62 Cornell L.
Rev. 405 (1977) 9
Sup. Ct. R. 21.1(f) 2

No. _____

IN THE

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OCTOBER TERM, 1987

THE STATE OF TEXAS, *Petitioner*

v.

RODNEY GENE BROADWAY, *Respondent*

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Petitioner respectfully requests that a writ of certiorari issue to review the decision and judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in the case of Ex parte Rodney Gene Broadway, number 69,836 in the court below, which granted respondent post-conviction habeas corpus relief.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals was not officially reported. It is reproduced in the Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Criminal Appeals rendered its decision granting respondent habeas corpus relief on June 17, 1987. No motion for rehearing was filed. Jurisdiction in this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED[1]

Amendment XIV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Texas Penal Code Annotated, Article 34 (Vernon Supp. 1966):

No act done in a state of insanity can be punished as an offense. No person who becomes insane after he committed an offense shall be tried for the same while in such condition. No person who becomes insane after he is found guilty shall be punished while in such condition; however the time he is confined in a State mental hospital for treatment may be considered time served and may be credited to the term of his sentence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In October 1966, a jury found respondent guilty of rape and determined that he was sane at the time of the offense. The jury also concluded respondent was sane at the time of trial, i.e., that he was competent to stand trial. See, *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. 375, 384-385, n. 1. (1966). All three issues — guilt-innocence, sanity at the time of the offense, and compe-

[1]Two other statutory provisions are found in the appendix because of their length. They are Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1986), and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, §§ 1-2 (Vernon 1966). See, SUP. CT. R. 21.1(f).

tency to stand trial — were before a single jury at the same time, and all were embodied in a single court's charge, although the two state-of-mind issues were set out in a separate part of the charge. R. I-58-61, 62-70. Respondent's conviction was affirmed on appeal. *Broadway v. State*, 418 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).

In December 1986, respondent filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the convicting court. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986). He contended that he had not been given a separate competency hearing at the time of his 1966 trial and that the jury instruction on competency was not constitutionally valid. Petitioner answered respondent's petition. In accord with subsection 2(d) of article 11.07, *supra*, evidence was developed. The convicting court then made detailed findings of fact, which are reproduced in the Appendix.

On June 17, 1987, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief as to respondent's first contention: It held that the denial of a separate competency hearing deprived respondent of due process, and it ordered that he be "remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Tarrant County to answer the indictment"—that is, it ordered a new trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not address respondent's other contention, concerning the competency charge, and it is not before the Court for review.

How The Federal Questions Were Presented

The Court of Criminal Appeals did not address the federal questions petitioner presents, although each was properly presented to that court and the trial court as well.

The constitutional claims in this case were first raised in the trial court. In his habeas petition respondent relied on due process and *Pate* for his claim that he had not received a separate competency hearing. R. I-4. Petitioner filed a timely

answer, accompanied by the full record from petitioner's 1966 trial. In the answer petitioner asserted the following defenses: that a retrospective competency hearing was possible and was the maximum relief respondent was entitled to; that the writ should not be entertained because of the long delay in its filing[2] and because in 1975 respondent absconded from parole; and that any relief not be granted automatically but be determined by an examination of the evidence. R. I-32-36.

In accord with section 2(d) of article 11.07, the trial court concluded that there were controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the case and ordered that the parties submit to the Court any proper documents relevant to the issues in the case. R. I-275-276. Subsequently, and with the express permission of the trial court, petitioner filed two supplemental answers to the habeas petition. R. I-309-311, 465-466; R. II-28. In the first supplement, petitioner contended that any *Pate* error in failing to hold a separate competency hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming evidence of respondent's competence at the time of trial. Petitioner also alleged that this evidence appeared within the trial record as well as outside it. R. I-310. In the second supplemental answer, petitioner contended that by failing to object at trial respondent had waived his right to complain of both the *Pate* error and the court's charge on competency; that the charge complied with due process requirements; and that there was no bona fide doubt about respondent's competence by the close of evidence at trial. R. I-465. Petitioner supported all of its allegations with documentary evidence presented to the court and made a part of the record.

Petitioner embodied all of its federal contentions in proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. I-517-524. Petitioner re-urged and argued its federal contentions in a

[2]Petitioner cited *Vasquez v. Hillery*, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624 (1986), and sought to distinguish it.

brief filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals approximately three weeks before that Court issued its opinion — even though no such brief is required by that court or by Texas law, the record compiled in the trial court forming the basis on which the Court of Criminal Appeals grants or denies a writ. See, art. 11.07, *supra*, §§ 2(c), 2(d), 3.

The opinion of the court below relies on federal law. It speaks of "the due process clauses of the State and federal constitutions;" it relies on *Pate*; and it does not contain a plain statement of reliance on adequate and independent state law grounds. App. 1-2. See, *Michigan v. Long*, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-1044 (1983). This reliance on federal law comports with the prior holdings of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which has consistently relied on *Pate* and federal due process for its conclusion that a separate competency hearing is required. *Morales v. State*, 427 S.W.2d 51, 53-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); *Townsend v. State*, 427 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); *Ex parte Locklin*, 583 S.W.2d 787, 788-789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). See, *Texas v. Brown*, 460 U.S. 730, 732-733, n. 1 (1983). Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the respondent's competency hearing was held in accord with the state statutory law existing at the time. App. 1.

As noted, the case has been remanded for re-trial, not for a possible retrospective competency hearing. The competency issue will therefore not again be litigated in its present form. Thus, the case is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). *New York v. Quarles*, 467 U.S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); *Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469, 481 (1975).

For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner's federal contentions are properly before this Court. See, *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 221 (1983).

Facts Pertinent to the Issue of Competency

In October 1966, seven and a half months after the decision in *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), respondent was tried by a jury for the offense of rape. At the beginning of trial, in accord with Texas law in effect at the time, respondent's counsel raised the issues of insanity at the time of the offense and "present insanity," that is, incompetency to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, § 2 (Vernon 1966);[3] *Townsend v. State*, 427 S.W.2d at 61. Article 46.02 provided that these issues were generally to be tried along with the questions of guilt and innocence; only if the defendant made a special request for a separate hearing of an "issue of insanity" was either mental issue to be tried separately, and then only with the prosecutor's consent and the trial judge's approval. Art. 46.02, *supra*, §§ 1, 2. Respondent's counsel made no request for a separate hearing and none was held. Nor did counsel ever object to the joined proceedings.

The entirety of respondent's evidence on the two "issues of insanity" came from Dr. H. Leake McCauley, a psychiatrist who is now dead. R. I-177-190, 308. On direct examination Dr. McCauley testified that he had interviewed respondent four months earlier and had also utilized the evaluations made by a psychologist and another psychiatrist. R. I-182-185. Dr. McCauley then testified that respondent was insane at the time of the offense and at the time of trial. R. I-189-190. He based this conclusion solely on his determination that respondent was mentally deficient — his "intellectual ability is compromised . . . especially when he is under a great amount of stress and strain." R. I-186-188.

However, on cross-examination Dr. McCauley retreated from his sweeping conclusion that respondent was insane at

[3]Article 46.02 has been significantly amended. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02 (Vernon 1979 and Supp. 1987).

all pertinent times. He testified that respondent *was* competent to stand trial, that is, that he was sane "as he sits here today." R. I-200-201. Dr. David Muller, a psychiatrist called by the state, also testified that respondent was competent to stand trial. R. I-217. The jury found respondent sane at the time of trial and at the time of the offense, and, at the same time, found him guilty of rape.

On appeal respondent made no complaint about the competency determination. *Broadway v. State*, 418 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).

While in prison respondent took I.Q. tests on three occasions between 1967 and 1986. The results of the tests demonstrate that his intelligence was in the center of the average intelligence level for the population as a whole, as do the results of the G.E.D. examination he passed while in prison. R. I-355-356, 430-432. After obtaining his G.E.D., respondent took junior college courses and obtained his Associate in Arts degree. R. I-357-359. He also scored well enough on educational achievement tests to place well above the average for the Texas prison population. R. I-430. The record contains an affidavit from an experienced forensic psychologist, Dr. Swen Helge, in which he states that it is possible to extrapolate back in time from respondent's test scores and college grades. By means of this extrapolation, Dr. Helge was able to conclude with reasonable psychological certainty that respondent was functioning in October 1966 with no less than average intelligence. R. I-431-432.

In his findings of fact the trial court specifically found that respondent was represented by competent counsel at his trial. App. 4. He also found that the evidence at trial clearly established that respondent was competent to stand trial, as did the records and activity of respondent after trial. App. 5. The court also found that a retrospective competency hearing was possible at the present time. App. 6. In its opinion the Court

of Criminal Appeals did not in any way dispute or "re-find" these or any of the other fact findings. App. 1-2. Compare, *Ex parte Blume*, 618 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (trial court's findings rejected by appellate court).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS HAS DECIDED THE FEDERAL QUESTION OF HARMLESS DUE PROCESS ERROR IN CONFLICT WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

A. The Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to acknowledge that the failure to hold a separate competency hearing may be harmless constitutional error.

Petitioner contends that the failure to afford a criminal defendant a separate *Pate* hearing can be harmless constitutional error. See generally, *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In *Rushen v. Spain*, 464 U.S. 114, 117-118, n. 2 (1983), this Court indicated that a deprivation of procedural due process could be harmless error.[4] And in *Rose v. Clark*, 106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986), the Court held that one type of due process error could be harmless under *Chapman*. See, 106 S.Ct. at 3104-3105, n. 3; *Sandstrom v. Montana*, 442 U.S. 510, 523-524 (1979). Moreover, as petitioner contended in the courts below, harmlessness is shown when the State establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the finding of competency was substantively justified. This is in accord with such cases as *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. 247, 263-267 (1978). The failure of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to consider these issues is thus in conflict with the pertinent decisions of this Court.

[4]However, see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, 464 U.S. at 126, n. 6.

It is clear that *Pate* deals with *procedural* due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 383 U.S. at 378, 386. And although this Court appears not to have said so explicitly, the procedures approved in that case are just as clearly intended to protect the defendant's *substantive* due process right not to be criminally prosecuted while incompetent. *Id.*, at 378. See, *Dusky v. United States*, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); *Drope v. Missouri*, 420 U.S. 162, 171-172 (1975); *Bishop v. United States*, 350 U.S. 961 (1956). Accord: *Acosta v. Turner*, 666 F.2d 949, 954 (5th Cir. 1982); *State v. Bertrand*, 465 A.2d 912, 914 (N.H. 1983). This substantive right is a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment and hence can be created by the Constitution as well as state law.[5] *Drope*, 420 U.S. at 171-172; *Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). Cf. *Board of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (Federal Constitution does not create property interests protected by procedural due process). See also, H. Monaghan, *Of "Liberty" and "Property,"* 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405 (1977).

However, this Court has recently emphasized that procedural due process is independent of the substantive rights being protected: "The categories of substance and procedure are distinct." *Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill*, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). And this is true regardless of whether the interest being protected is life, liberty, or property. *Id.*

Accordingly, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a procedural remedy where there has been no deprivation of a protected liberty interest. *Davidson v. Cannon*, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670 (1986). The Court has also held that "[w]here the deprivation of a protected interest

[5]In fact, the interest was also created by State law. Article 34 of the Texas penal code that was in effect during respondent's trial created the same substantive due process interest. It prohibited the trial of anyone who became insane after he committed a criminal offense. See, *Townsend v. State*, 427 S.W.2d at 58, 63.

is substantively justified but procedures are deficient in some respect," the injury caused by the deficiency is often minimal and sometimes only hypothetical. *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. at 263-264. In a suit for damages arising from such a claim, the injured party is entitled to recover only nominal damages not to exceed one dollar. *Id.* at 266-267; *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 14, n. 12 (1980).

Petitioner contends that the approach of *Davidson* and *Carey* to deficiencies in procedural due process is the equivalent of the harmless error rule in criminal cases. See, *Rose v. Clark*, *supra*; *Rushen v. Spain*, 464 U.S. at 117-118, n. 2. See also, *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. at 22; *Schneble v. Florida*, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972); *United States v. Hasting*, 461 U.S. 499, 507-509 (1983). The Court should grant the petition to address this issue in the context of the more specific issue of the applicability of the harmless error rule to *Pate*'s procedural due process requirements. This is an especially appropriate case for addressing the issue because the decision of the Texas court is so clearly in conflict with *Chapman*'s express rejection of the notion that constitutional error is always reversible regardless of harm. 386 U.S. at 21-22. That court has consistently followed the path it took in this case: Upon discovering that competency was tried together with guilt-innocence, it has ordered a new trial without regard to harm. E.g., *Ex parte Locklin*, 583 S.W.2d at 791. The Court should grant the petition to address this conflict.

B. The Court should grant the petition to decide what factors are to be considered in determining harmless error under *Pate v. Robinson*.

This Court has always insisted that the harmless error rule will not apply unless the error is determined to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. at 24; *Schneble v. Florida*, 405 U.S. at 428; *United States*

v. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 508-509. However, the Court has not been so consistent in determining what specific factors will be emphasized in deciding whether a particular type of constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In *Chapman*, for example, the prosecutor's arguments about the defendants' failure to testify were not harmless because the Court concluded there was a reasonable possibility they might have contributed to the conviction. 386 U.S. at 24-26. In *Schneble*, a violation of *Bruton v. United States*, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), was harmless because the improperly-admitted confession of the co-defendant would not have affected the minds of an average jury in such a way as to make the State's case significantly more persuasive. 405 U.S. at 432. In *Hasting*, the Court emphasized the overwhelming evidence of guilt in holding that a prosecutor's improper argument was harmless. 461 U.S. at 512. In *Rushen v. Spain*, 464 U.S. 114, 116-122, an *ex parte* communication between a juror and the trial judge was harmless because it did not affect the impartiality of the juror or the rest of the jury. And in *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986), the error in denying a defendant the right to cross-examine a witness for bias was deemed harmless on the basis of "a host of factors" germane to that particular constitutional right.

The opinion in *Van Arsdall* thus explains the lack of uniformity in these harmless error cases: The determinative factors in any analysis of harm should be pertinent to the particular constitutional deprivation being assessed. 106 S.Ct. at 1438.

At least some of the factors relevant to deciding whether *Pate* error is harmless can be found in the Court's decision in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). There the Court identified three factors to be evaluated in determining how much procedural due process is required in a particular situation: the private interest, the governmental interest, and the

value of additional procedural safeguards in light of the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest through the procedures used. 424 U.S. at 334-335. Accord: *Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. at 473; *Ake v. Oklahoma*, 470 U.S. at 68, 77 (1985). "At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected . . . and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost." *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. at 348, quoted in *Ingraham v. Wright*, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).

The Court's opinion in *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. at 263-264, is helpful in locating that point for purposes of determining harmless *Pate* error. If it can be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the finding of competency was "substantively justified" in a given case, the failure to hold a separate hearing on the issue should be deemed harmless. 435 U.S. at 263. See also, *Rose v. Clark*, 106 S.Ct. at 3108. That is, if the facts of the particular case establish beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the determination of the defendant's competency was unaffected by the absence of a separate hearing; (2) that the burdens on the state were heavy, or will be if a new trial is ordered; and (3) that the risk of an erroneous determination of the defendant's competency was minimal or non-existent and a separate hearing would not have changed the result; then the error can be labeled harmless. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. at 335. See also, *Ake v. Oklahoma*, 470 U.S. at 77.

The Court should grant the petition to determine that these factors are appropriate when a reviewing court is deciding whether *Pate* error is harmless.

C. The petition should be granted to decide whether facts developed after trial can be utilized in the determination of harmless *Pate* error.

If a criminal defendant does not raise a federal claim until after he is convicted, the State should be allowed to utilize evi-

dence that also develops after conviction in its effort to show that the federal claim is without merit and that the error is harmless. Specifically, if respondent claims that he did not receive all of the procedural protection offered by *Pate v. Robinson*, the State should be entitled to show the invalidity of the underlying substantive due process interest by introducing evidence that developed after trial. That evidence should be considered in assessing harm.

To the extent that respondent presented a substantive claim that he was incompetent, he did so solely through the direct examination of a psychiatrist who said respondent's low intelligence rendered him insane.[6] In his post-conviction habeas corpus petition he claimed that the lack of a separate competency hearing deprived him of due process. To refute this claim the State introduced into the record documentary evidence showing that the respondent's intelligence was definitely not low. This evidence came principally from records of the Texas Department of Corrections, where respondent was incarcerated after his conviction.

Of course, respondent's prison records did not exist at the time of trial. In the ordinary case, a criminal conviction is on direct appeal and the reviewing court looks at the trial record to determine whether a given error was harmless. E.g., *United States v. Hasting*, 461 U.S. at 509-510; *Schneble v. Florida*, 405 U.S. at 430-432; *Harrington v. California*, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).

This is not an ordinary case. Respondent lost his direct appeal and waited twenty years after trial to make his initial claim that *Pate* was violated. Of course, the delay does not bar the claim. *Vasquez v. Hillery*, 106 S.Ct. at 624. However, petitioner contends that relevant events occurring during the

[6]However, the witness stated on cross-examination that respondent was not insane as he sat in the courtroom.

period of delay should be considered in gauging the harm caused by the *Pate* violation and in determining the validity of respondent's due process claim. Support for this contention comes from *Drope v. Missouri*.

In *Drope*, the Court addressed a state trial court's failure to order a psychiatric examination of the defendant. In the course of the post-trial collateral attack on Drope's conviction the trial court heard relevant testimony on the issue from two psychiatrists. 420 U.S. at 169. The weight and effect to be given this testimony was a question this Court addressed at two different points in its opinion — and seemingly in two different ways.

In footnote 17 of its opinion, 420 U.S. at 181-182, the Court stated that this testimony was "not relevant to the question before us" — the question being whether the trial court should have ordered a mid-trial psychiatric examination. 420 U.S. at 179. However, in another part of the opinion the Court evaluated the post-conviction record to see if it revealed that the Missouri Courts had failed "to give proper weight to the information suggesting incompetency which came to light during trial." 420 U.S. at 179. In making this examination, the Court appears to have *relied* on the post-trial psychiatric testimony. 420 U.S. at 179-180, n. 15.

What this seemingly inconsistent analysis of the post-trial psychiatric testimony suggests is that such testimony is not logically relevant to an evaluation of the correctness of the trial court's conduct in the middle of trial. However, it is relevant to an analysis of the post-conviction decisions made by the state courts when *they* were evaluting what the trial court should, in retrospect, have done.

To some extent this only restates the obvious — that a trial court cannot see the future but a reviewing court does examine the past. Yet it has a significance for this case and due pro-

cess analysis generally. For if the concern is the process the defendant received rather than a particular piece of testimony the jury heard, the harmless error rule should allow the parties and courts to go outside the evidence presented to the jury to determine the effect of the acknowledged procedural deprivation. The issue should be whether the substantive due process right was vindicated despite the procedural deprivation, not whether the jury received or failed to receive certain evidence. *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. at 263-264; *Schneble v. Florida*, 405 U.S. at 428-429; *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 106 S.Ct. at 1433-1434.

Thus, *Drope* suggests that events occurring after trial can be utilized as part of a determination of harmless *Pate* error. Additional support for this conclusion can be found in *Maggio v. Fulford*, 462 U.S. 111 (1983). In reviewing a federal habeas corpus claim that a state trial judge should have ordered a competency hearing, the Court relied on evidence of competency that did not develop until after trial. 462 U.S. at 114, n. 3.

Similarly, in *Rushen v. Spain*, 464 U.S. at 116, 117-118, n. 2, the evidence from a post-verdict hearing was utilized to show that federal constitutional error, most likely due process error, was harmless. Cf. *Ponte v. Real*, 471 U.S. 491, 497-498 (1985) (prison officials may wait until after a disciplinary hearing is concluded to explain their refusal to allow witnesses to testify at the hearing).

It therefore appears that the decision of the court below conflicts with this Court's opinions in *Drope*, *Maggio*, and *Rushen*. The Court should accordingly grant the petition to determine whether evidence developed after trial can be used to assess the prejudicial effect of error in the failure to give respondent a separate competency hearing.

D. The facts of respondent's case clearly demonstrate the application of the harmless error rule to the failure to hold a separate competency hearing.

Respondent's own psychiatrist, Dr. McCauley, testified on cross-examination that respondent was competent as he sat in the courtroom, and the State's expert psychiatric witness agreed that he was competent to stand trial. The only evidence to the contrary was Dr. McCauley's blanket statement on direct, which he effectively recanted on cross-examination. There was no re-direct examination of Dr. McCauley.

Also, respondent's claim of incompetency was based solely on his supposed low intelligence, yet the habeas corpus record shows without dispute that he was functioning at the time of trial with no less than average intelligence. In the years immediately following his trial, he took and passed the G.E.D. examination with scores indicative of average intelligence, and he took enough college courses to obtain an Associate in Arts degree. His I.Q. scores also refute his contention of incompetence based on low intelligence.

The failure to provide respondent with a separate competency hearing was harmless error under these circumstances. The jury finding of competency was substantively justified beyond a reasonable doubt; it would not have been affected by the use of a separate jury. The future burdens on the State of Texas will be significant—not only a re-trial, but re-trial after more than twenty years, with the attendant loss of memory and even of witnesses. One takes no risk in concluding that an erroneous determination of respondent's competency simply did not occur. The failure to hold a separate competency hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, respondent's case presents a distinctive opportunity for the Court to address the issue of harmless error in *Pate* proceedings and hence in all criminal cases where the proce-

dures required by due process are in some way deficient. By failing to consider the case in this light the Texas court placed itself in conflict with *Rose v. Clark*, 106 S.Ct. at 3104-3109; *Rushen v. Spain*, 464 U.S. at 117-118, n. 2; *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. at 263-267; and *Davidson v. Cannon*, 106 S.Ct. at 670.

II

IN DECIDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL RATHER THAN A RETROSPECTIVE COMPETENCY HEARING, THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS DECIDED A FEDERAL QUESTION IN CONFLICT WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

As petitioner has shown, there was only a *de minimis* violation of procedural due process in respondent's case. The jury verdict finding him competent was substantively justified beyond a reasonable doubt. If this were a civil claim for damages, respondent would only be entitled to nominal damages not to exceed one dollar. *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. at 266-267. *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. at 14, n. 12.

However, the remedy fashioned by the Texas court is to remand for a new trial on all issues. App. 2. Accord: *Ex parte Locklin*, 683 S.W.2d at 789-791. This is disproportionate in the extreme, both with regard to the result in civil cases and to the actual impact of the *Pate* violation on respondent's 1966 trial. The proper remedy is to order that the State writ be denied because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As an alternative, petitioner contends respondent should now be given a hearing on his competency to stand trial in 1966; this is the most relief he is entitled to.

Petitioner is aware that because of their "inherent difficulties" such retrospective hearings have not previously found

favor in this Court. *Drope v. Missouri*, 420 U.S. at 183; *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. at 386-387; *Dusky v. United States*, 362 U.S. at 403. However, this case is free of those difficulties. All of the testimony from the previous trial is available, and the psychiatrist who testified for the State is not only available—he remembers his 1966 psychiatric evaluation of respondent and is currently able to testify as to respondent's competency in 1966. R. I-295. In light of these facts and the substantive insignificance of the *Pate* violation, a retrospective competency hearing is a proper alternative to denying respondent relief altogether.

The Court should grant the petition to consider the disproportionality of the remedy ordered by the Court of Criminal Appeals. That remedy is at odds with this Court's holding in *Carey v. Piphus* and *Hughes v. Rowe*.

III

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE FEDERAL QUESTION OF WAIVER IN CONFLICT WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

In *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. at 384, the State argued that the defendant deliberately waived a competency hearing by failing to make a timely request during trial. The Court responded: "But it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to have this court determine his capacity to stand trial." *Id.*

The court below has "overextended" this holding. See, *Jones v. Barnes*, 463 U.S. 745, 750 (1983). In Texas, if the defendant does in fact receive a competency hearing but fails to request that the hearing be separate from the trial on the merits, he has not waived the right to complain later of the

failure to give him a *separate* hearing. *Ex parte Locklin*, 583 S.W.2d at 788.[7]

The holding from *Pate* quoted above is designed to preclude the incongruous and fundamentally unfair result that would ensue if an incompetent defendant were personally required to announce his own incompetence. This would put an impossible burden of assertiveness on the incompetent defendant. However, once the issue of incompetence has been made known to the trial court, the protections of *Pate* are set in motion, and no burden falls on the accused himself. At that point it should be the duty of *counsel* to make the decision whether the competency issue shall be tried separately or alongside the issues of guilt and innocence. This choice is not one of those "fundamental decisions regarding the case" which the accused must make himself. *Jones v. Barnes*, 463 U.S. at 751. It is instead a matter best left to "counsel's professional evaluation." *Id.* Unlike the substantive assertion of incompetence, it is a tactical decision of the type counsel ordinarily makes. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 688-689 (1984).

Respondent's trial was held seven and a half months after *Pate* was decided. At that time respondent's competent counsel successfully invoked respondent's right to have his competency determined by a jury. App. 4. In the absence of a showing that counsel were unaware of *Pate* or that they fell below objective standards of reasonable professional competence, it should be presumed that counsel knowingly chose to waive respondent's right to a separate hearing on competency. See, *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. at 687-690; *Darden v. Wainwright*, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2473-2475 (1986).

---

[7]The court below relied on *Locklin* in denying relief. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the holding of *Locklin* was the reason for that court's refusal to address petitioner's waiver claim. See *Texas v. Brown*, 460 U.S. at 732-733, n. 1.

The decision of the court below conflicts with this Court's holding in *Jones v. Barnes* and incorrectly expands the holding in *Pate*. The petition should be granted to address this conflict.

CONCLUSION

In light of the facts of respondent's case, the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "trivializes the principle that the State may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." *Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft*, 436 U.S. 1, 22 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The procedural violation affected none of respondent's substantial rights. The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the fact of harmlessness raises important constitutional issues for this Court: whether *Pate* error can be harmless; on what bases harm should be assessed; and whether the granting of a new trial is a proper remedy for *Pate* error which did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. Also presented is the important *Pate* issue of whether the error in failing to provide a separate competency hearing can be waived.

The issues presented are ripe for adjudication because, as the petition makes clear, this Court has not yet taken the opportunity to expressly re-examine *Pate v. Robinson* in light of the important recent due process decisions of this Court. See, *Maggio v. Fulford*, 462 U.S. at 119 (White, J., concurring).

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

OPINION OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

Ex Parte Rodney Gene Broadway

No. 69,836

Habeas Corpus Application from TARRANT County

OPINION

This is a post conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P.

On October 25, 1966, applicant was convicted of the offense of rape. Punishment was assessed at life. Applicant's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to this Court. Broadway v. State, 418 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1967).

The applicant now claims that he was denied due process of law because the issue of his competence to stand trial was submitted to the jury in the same proceeding as the issue of his guilt or innocence. The record before this Court supports the applicant's contention.

Although submission of the competency issue to the jury in the same proceeding as that which determined guilt or innocence appeared to comply fully with the statutory law existing at the time of the applicant's trial, it is now well established that the due process clauses of the State and federal constitutions mandate a hearing on the competency issue apart from the determination of guilt or innocence. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Ex parte Locklin, 583 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex.Crim.App. 1968); Morales v. State, 427 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Crim.App. 1968). Further, this Court has held

that *Pate v. Robinson*, supra, will be applied retroactively. Ex parte Halford, 536 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976).

The relief sought is granted. The applicant's conviction in cause number 72364 in the Criminal District Court No. 3 of Tarrant County is set aside. The applicant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Tarrant County to answer the indictment in said cause.

PER CURIAM

Delivered: June 17, 1987

Do Not Publish

MEMORANDUM AND FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT

No. C-3-1220-72364-A

Ex Parte Rodney Gene Broadway

In The Criminal District Court Number Three
Of TARRANT County, Texas

COURT'S MEMORANDUM AND FINDINGS OF FACT

Pursuant to Art. 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. and based on this court's records, the evidence before the Court, and other documentation made a part of the record in this case, the Court adopts the following Memorandum and Findings of Fact.

MEMORANDUM

Applicant has petitioned this Court for post-conviction habeas corpus relief in connection with his 1966 conviction for the offense of rape as alleged under Art. 1183, V.A.P.C. (1925). Applicant pleaded not guilty to a jury, which found him guilty and assessed his punishment at life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. *Broadway v. State*, 418 S.W.2d 679. Applicant now contends that he is entitled to a new trial because he did not have a separate hearing on his competency to stand trial in 1966, in violation of *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. 375, and because the court's charge on competency was improper.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On April 19, 1966, the Tarrant County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for rape pursuant to the 1925 Penal Code. This offense, which was alleged to have occurred on January 13, 1966, provides the basis for this post-conviction habeas corpus application.

2. On April 26, 1966, the trial court appointed two competent local attorneys to represent Applicant.

3. On May 17, 1966, Applicant's counsel filed a motion asking the Court to appoint a psychiatrist to examine Applicant. The motion was based on counsel's belief that Applicant may have been legally insane at the time of the offense and "at this time."

4. On May 27, 1966, the Court granted Applicant's motion to appoint a psychiatrist and allowed counsel to select who that psychiatrist would be.

5. Trial began on October 24, 1966. On that date, Applicant's counsel filed an affidavit of insanity alleging that Applicant was of unsound mind "at this time" and asking that the Court declare a mistrial. This was in accord with the requirements of the statute in effect at that time, Art. 46.02, Sec. 2(a), V.A.C.C.P. (1966).

6. When Applicant was arraigned on October 24, 1966, he pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Later that day, his plea before the jury was "Not guilty."

7. At the time of trial, the procedural law applicable to the case had been decided by the United State's [sic] Supreme Court seven and a half months earlier in *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. 375.

8. Applicant raised a bona fide doubt as to his competency at the time of his trial, as well as insanity at the time of the offense.

9. Applicant's trial was in violation of procedural due process as promulgated in *Pate v. Robinson, supra.*

10. Applicant presented evidence on the issues of competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense to the same jury that decided his guilt or innocence.

11. The State presented evidence to rebut applicant's claims of incompetency and insanity to the same jury that decided applicant's guilt or innocence.

12. The evidence submitted at trial clearly established that Applicant was competent at the time of trial and sane at the time of the offense.

13. The Court further finds that the records and activity of the Applicant subsequent to trial clearly established that Applicant was competent at the time of trial and sane at the time of the offense.

14. The evidence of Applicant's guilt was overwhelming as to the Applicant's having committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

15. The trial court charged the same jury that decided applicant's guilt or innocence on the issues of applicant's competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense.

16. Applicant's competent counsel did not object to the court's charge. Specifically, no objection was made to the charge on competency (sanity at the time of trial) or on the inclusion of that charge in the charge on guilt-innocence.

17. The issue of incompetency was tried in accord with Texas statutory law in effect at the time of trial. The jury was charged in accord with then-existing Texas law.

18. The jury found Applicant competent (sane at the time of trial) and sane at the time of the offense. In the second part of the charge, the jury found Applicant guilty. After hearing further evidence, the jury assessed Applicant's punishment at life imprisonment.

19. On his direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals Applicant made no complaint about the determination of his competency to stand trial or the manner in which this issue

was heard and submitted to the jury. Appellant's conviction was affirmed on July 12, 1967. The Court of Criminal Appeals issued its mandate October 13, 1967.

20. The trial court submitted the definitions of competency to stand trial and insanity at the time of the offense in accord with Texas statutory law in effect at that time, and those definitions were not substantially different from the definitions of those terms as used today.

21. It is possible at this time to have a procedurally correct competency hearing by utilizing the live testimony of Dr. David J. Muller as well as transcribed testimony from the trial record.

ORDER

It is therefore ordered that:

1. The foregoing Memorandum and Findings of Fact are adopted by this Court.

2. The Clerk of this Court file these findings and transmit them along with the Writ Transcript to the Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals as required by law.

3. The Clerk of the Court furnish copies of the Memorandum, Findings, and Order to the Attorney for Applicant, Robert Udashen, Founders Square, Suite 181, 900 Jackson Street, Dallas, Texas 75202, and to the Attorney for the State, David Chapman, Assistant District Attorney, 200 West Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201

Signed and entered this the 9 day of April, 1987.

/s/Don Leonard
Judge Presiding

VOLUMINOUS STATUTORY MATERIAL

1. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated, art. 11.07, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1986):

Sec. 2. (a) After final conviction in any felony case, the writ must be made returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas at Austin, Texas.

(b) Whenever a petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed after final conviction in a felony case, the clerk shall transfer or assign it to the court in which the conviction being challenged was obtained. When the petition is received by that court, a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals, shall issue by operation of law. The clerk of that court shall make appropriate notation thereof, assign to the case a file number (ancillary to that of the conviction being challenged), and send a copy of the petition by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the attorney representing the state in that court, who shall have 15 days in which it may answer the petition. Matters alleged in the petition not admitted by the state are deemed denied.

(c) Within 20 days of the expiration of the time in which the state is allowed to answer, it shall be the duty of the convicting court to decide whether there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant's confinement. If the convicting court decides that there are no such issues, the clerk shall immediately transmit to the Court of Criminal Appeals a copy of the petition, any answers filed, and a certificate reciting the date upon which that finding was made. Failure of the court to act within the allowed 20 days shall constitute such a finding.

(d) If the convicting court decides that there are controverted, previously unresolved facts which are material to the legality of the applicant's confinement, it shall enter an order within 20 days of the expiration of the time allowed for the

state to reply, designating the issues of fact to be resolved. To resolve those issues the court may order affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, and hearings, as well as using personal recollection. Also, the convicting court may appoint an attorney or a magistrate to hold a hearing and make findings of fact. An attorney so appointed shall be compensated as provided in Article 26.05 of this code. It shall be the duty of the reporter who is designated to transcribe a hearing held pursuant to this article to prepare a transcript within 15 days of its conclusion. After the convicting court makes findings of fact or approves the findings of the person designated to make them, the clerk of the convicting court shall immediately transmit to the Court of Criminal Appeals, under one cover, the petition, any answers filed, any motions filed, transcripts of all depositions and hearings, any affidavits, and any other matters such as official records used by the court in resolving issues of fact.

Sec. 3. The Court of Criminal Appeals may deny relief upon the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge without docketing the cause, or may direct that the cause be docketed and heard as though originally presented to said court or as an appeal. Upon reviewing the record the court shall enter its judgment remanding the petitioner to custody or ordering his release, as the law and facts may justify. The mandate of the court shall issue to the court issuing the writ, as in other criminal cases. After conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner.

2. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated, art. 46.02, §§ 1-2 (Vernon 1966):

Insanity in defense or in bar

No prior trial except by agreement

Sec. 1. No issue of insanity shall be tried in advance of trial on the merits, except upon written application on behalf of the accused with the consent of the State's attorney and the approval of the trial judge.

Procedure at trial

Sec. 2. (a) At the trial on the merits, the trial court shall hear evidence on the issue of present insanity only if prior to the offer thereof there be filed on behalf of the defendant a written motion asking the court to hear evidence on such issue and requesting the court to declare a mistrial because of such insanity in the manner and to the extent provided for in this Article.

(b) When the issue of present insanity is tried, the following rules shall apply:

(1) The issue of present insanity shall be submitted to the jury only if supported by competent testimony.

(2) (a) Instructions submitting the issue of present insanity shall be framed so as to require the jury to state in its verdict whether defendant is sane or insane at the time of the trial.

(b) Instructions submitting the issue of present insanity shall also require the jury, if it finds the defendant presently insane, to state whether the defendant requires hospitalization in a mental hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others.

(3) The charge shall instruct the jury that if it finds defendant is presently insane it will not consider or deliberate upon

any other issues except (a) whether the defendant should be committed to a mental hospital; and (b) whether he was sane or insane as of the time of the alleged offense, if such issue be submitted.

(c) When the issue of insanity as of the time of the alleged offense is tried, the following rules shall apply:

(1) The issue of insanity as of the time of the alleged offense shall be submitted to the jury only if supported by competent evidence tending to show that defendant was insane as of the time of the alleged offense.

(2) Instructions submitting the issue of insanity as of the time of the alleged offense shall be framed so as to require the jury to state in its verdict whether defendant was sane or insane as of the time of the alleged offense.

(3) If the jury finds the defendant to have been insane at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed, the defendant shall stand acquitted of the alleged offense.

(d) The following rules shall apply upon defendant's being acquitted by reason of the jury's returning a finding that he was insane as of the time of the alleged offense:

(1) If the jury finds the defendant to be insane at the time of trial, and it further finds that the defendant should be committed to a mental institution, the court shall enter an order committing the defendant to a State mental hospital and placing him in the custody of the sheriff for transportation to a State mental hospital to be confined therein until he becomes sane. The court shall further order that a transcript of all medical testimony adduced before the jury, shall be forthwith prepared by the court reporter and such transcript shall accompany the patient to the State mental hospital.

(2) If the jury returns a finding that defendant is sane as of the time of the trial, then the defendant shall be finally discharged.

(3) If there be no jury finding on the issue of present insanity, then the court, if the discharge or going at large of defendant be considered by the court manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people, shall order defendant committed to jail or other suitable place pending the prompt initiation and prosecution by the attorney r the State or other person designated by the court of appropriate civil proceedings to determine whether defendant shall be committed to a mental institution, or the court may give defendant into the care of his friends on their giving satisfactory security for his proper care and protection; otherwise, defendant shall be discharged.

(e) Where the jury finds that the defendant is presently insane, but does not find that he was insane at the time of the offense (either because such issue was not submitted or because the jury failed to find on that issue or because it found that he was not insane at such time), the court shall enter a mistrial as to all issues except the issue of present insanity. If the jury finds that the defendant should be committed to a mental institution, the proper order so committing him shall be entered by the court.

EDITOR'S NOTE

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1987

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Petitioner

v.

RODNEY GENE BROADWAY,
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Robert Nathan Udashen
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900 Jackson Street
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Attorney for Rodney Gene Broadway

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE FEDERAL CLAIMS 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT 3

I. THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS HAS CON CONSISTENTLY REMEDIED VIOLATIONS OF PATE V. ROBINSON IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THAT OPINION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 3

II. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF HARMLESS ERROR IN THIS CASE 5

III. A VIOLATION OF PATE V. ROBINSON SHOULD NEVER BE CONSIDERED HARMLESS ERROR 5

IV. FACTS THAT CAME INTO EXISTENCE AFTER A DEFENDANT'S TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A VIOLATION OF PATE V. ROBINSON WAS HARMLESS 6

V. RESPONDENT CLEARLY RAISED A BONA FIDE DOUBT AS TO HIS COMPETENCY AT HIS TRIAL 6

VI. ONCE A PATE VIOLATION IS ESTABLISHED, A STATE COURT SHOULD BE FREE TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL RATHER THAN A RETROSPECTIVE COMPETENCY HEARING 7

VII. A PATE VIOLATION IS NOT BARRED BY THE FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO OBJECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A SEPARATE COMPETENCY HEARING 8

CONCLUSION 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).....	4
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).....	5
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).....	3,5,6,7,8
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).....	3,5,8
Ex parte Hagans, 558 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).	4
Ex parte Johnson, 587 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)	4
Ex parte Locklin, 583 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)	5
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).....	2
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).....	5
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).....	2
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).....	3,4,5,6,7, 8,9
Rose v. Clark, _____ U.S. _____, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986)	6
Turner v. State, 626 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).	4
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. _____, 106 S.Ct. 617 (1986)	7

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Rodney Gene Broadway, Respondent, respectfully asks that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking review of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in the case of Ex parte Rodney Gene Broadway, number 69,836.

THE FEDERAL CLAIMS

The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas is based on the Texas Constitution as well as the United States Constitution. (App.[1] p. 1). Thus, this Court should not review that decision because it rests on an adequate and independent ground in state law. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945). This state ground is indicated clearly and expressly in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-1041 (1983).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On pages 6 and 7 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner misinterprets the testimony of Dr. H. Leake McCauley concerning Respondent's competency to stand trial. Dr. McCauley consistently testified that Respondent was not competent to stand trial. He never testified to the opposite conclusion. The portion of Dr. McCauley's testimony that Petitioner apparently misunderstands is the following:

Q: (By Prosecutor): "And as he sits there today he is perfectly -- he does know right from wrong and the nature and the qualities of his act, doesn't he?"

A: By (Dr. McCauley): "Well, as I say in regard to superficial things and in regard to as they are applied to other people, but I think should the situation be where he once again is placed in a situation where he had to call upon his basic resources of intelligence and abstract judgment to keep him in line with what society deems to be reasonable and appropriate, that he could not do that."

Q: "Well, there is no stress upon him at this time?

A: "He is protected. He has a man sitting behind him with a gun."

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[1]App. refers to the appendix filed as part of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Q: "So he would know the nature and quality of his acts and would know right from wrong?"

A: "In a superficial sense, yes."

Q: "He would?"

A: "As he sits here in the courtroom today I would say yes." R. I 200-201.

Although the prosecutor may have intended to show that Respondent was competent as he sat in the courtroom that is not what he did. It is obvious that the prosecutor's questions concerned the legal test for insanity at the time of the offense and not competency to stand trial. The proper test to determine if an individual is competent to stand trial is "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). The prosecutor did not even come close to asking Dr. McCauley if Respondent met this test. It is thus a clear distortion of the record to claim that Dr. McCauley testified that Respondent was competent to stand trial.

It should be remembered that in his findings of fact the trial court found that Respondent raised a bona fide doubt as to his competency to stand trial. (App. p. 4). Such a doubt is sufficient to require the trial judge to impanel a jury and hold a hearing on the accused's competency to stand trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I.

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS HAS CONSISTENTLY REMEDIED VIOLATIONS OF PATE V. ROBINSON IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THAT OPINION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966), this Court held that where the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency, the trial judge must, on his own motion, impanel a jury and hold a competency hearing. Further, State procedures must be

adequate to protect an accused's right not to be tried while he is legally incompetent. Id. at 378. The failure of the State to develop and follow procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not be tried while incompetent deprives the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).

The precise procedures that a State must adhere to in protecting a defendant's right not to be tried while incompetent have never been specified by this Court. It is thus fair to say that the states are free to follow whatever procedures they deem proper as long as those procedures do not fall below the minimum standards of due process.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has always interpreted Pate to require a competency hearing separate from the trial on the merits. Ex parte Johnson, 587 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). This is so that the determination of an accused's competency can be made uncluttered by evidence of the offense itself. Ex parte Hagans, 558 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The Court of Criminal Appeals has never ordered a retrospective competency hearing in a case where the question of the defendant's competency was submitted to the same jury that decided the defendant's guilt or innocence. Instead, the Court of Criminal Appeals always finds a conviction in such a case to be fundamentally defective. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 626 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In every such case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reverses and remands the case for a new trial. Id.

This is clearly not a case where "The Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to acknowledge that the failure to hold a separate competency hearing may be harmless constitutional error." (Pet. for Cert. p. 8). Instead, this is a case where the Court of Criminal Appeals has followed clearly developed state procedures designed to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent. This falls directly under the mandate of Pate v. Robinson, supra.

The Court of Criminal Appeals decision below certainly does not conflict with any decisions of this Court. In fact, the case of Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), cited by Petitioner, recognizes that procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process. Id. at 259. It might be added that the

rules are also shaped by the interest they protect. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Thus the rules devised by the Court of Criminal Appeals to protect a defendant's right not to be tried while incompetent recognize the risk of error when the issues of guilt-innocence, sanity, and competency are submitted to the same jury [See, e.g. Ex parte Locklin, 583 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)] and the difficulty that this Court has always recognized in holding a retrospective competency hearing. [See, e.g. Pate v. Robinson, supra at 387; Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975)]. The procedure followed by the Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore proper and consistent with Pate v. Robinson, supra.

II.

THERE IS NO QUESTION OF HARMLESS ERROR IN THIS CASE

This case is not an appropriate vehicle for deciding "what factors are to be considered in determining harmless error under Pate v. Robinson." (Pet. for Cert. p. 10). As has already been demonstrated, the Court of Criminal Appeals remedied the Pate violation herein in a manner entirely consistent with that opinion. Petitioner simply dislikes the remedy chosen by the Court of Criminal Appeals to protect Respondent's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent. This Court, however, should not overturn a remedy chosen by a state court that meets minimum due process levels.

III.

A VIOLATION OF PATE V. ROBINSON SHOULD NEVER BE CONSIDERED HARMLESS ERROR

The trial of an incompetent person violates due process. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). State courts must therefore develop procedures to insure that an incompetent person is not put to trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). When such procedures are not followed any conviction obtained against the defendant must be reversed. Drope v. Missouri, supra at 183. The protection of a defendant's right not be tried while incompetent is one of those substantial rights of a defendant the violation of which that can never be harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23

(1967). This is because the trial of an incompetent defendant aborts the basic trial process. See, Rose v. Clark, _____ U.S. _____, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3106 fn. 6(1986).

Once a bona fide doubt is raised as to a defendant's competency, as it was in this case, a defendant should be given a competency hearing separate and apart from the trial on the merits. This Court should not engage in the process of reweighing the evidence of the defendant's competency in order to determine if the failure to hold a separate competency hearing was harmless. Otherwise, there would never be a need to hold a separate competency hearing.

IV.

FACTS THAT COME INTO EXISTENCE
AFTER A DEFENDANT'S TRIAL SHOULD NOT
BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR
NOT A VIOLATION OF PATE V. ROBINSON WAS HARMLESS

An appellate court should go no further in reviewing a violation of Pate v. Robinson, than determining if a bona fide doubt was raised as to the defendant's competency. If such a doubt was raised, then the Court should reverse the conviction in order to protect the defendant's right not to be tried while incompetent. A review of evidence that came into existence after the defendant's trial in order to determine if the defendant was incompetent when tried is particularly inappropriate because of the ever-changing nature of a person's mental status. Just because a person was competent six months or a year after his trial does not mean that he was competent when tried. In fact, a defendant's mental status may even change from one day to the next during his trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975).

It is certainly not proper for an appellate court to consider evidence that was never presented to the trial jury or reviewed by the witnesses, particularly the expert witnesses, who testified at the trial. Such a procedure would clearly not comport with due process.

V.

RESPONDENT CLEARLY RAISED A BONA FIDE
DOUBT AS TO HIS COMPETENCY AT HIS TRIAL

Respondent's psychiatrist, Dr. H. Leake McCauley, testified unequivocally that Respondent was incompetent to stand trial. Dr. McCauley never testified that Respondent was competent as he sat in the courtroom. What Dr. McCauley did say was that Respondent knew the nature and quality of his acts and the difference between right and wrong as he sat in the courtroom. Despite Petitioner's assertion to the contrary, this is not the same thing as saying that Respondent was "competent as he sat in the courtroom." (Pet. for Cert. p. 16).

There is no question that a bona fide doubt as to Respondent's competency was raised during Respondent's trial. On the day of trial, Respondent's attorney filed an affidavit of insanity alleging that Respondent was of unsound mind "at this time." (App. 4). Cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 fn. 13 (1975). Dr. McCauley testified that Respondent was incompetent to stand trial. The trial court charged the jury on the issue of Respondent's competency to stand trial. (App. p. 5). On review, the habeas court found that indeed Respondent had raised a bona fide doubt as to his competency.

The evidence at trial clearly entitled Respondent to a separate hearing on his competency. Since he was not given such a hearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Respondent's conviction and ordered that he be given a new trial. Any burden on the State of Texas in retrying Respondent is simply irrelevant to the determination of this petition. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. _____, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624 (1986).

VI.

ONCE A PATE VIOLATION IS ESTABLISHED,
A STATE COURT SHOULD BE FREE TO ORDER A
NEW TRIAL RATHER THAN A RETROSPECTIVE
COMPETENCY HEARING

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the submission of the competency issue to the same jury that decided Respondent's guilt or innocence violated Respondent's right to due process under the United States and Texas constitutions. (App. p. 1). The Court of Criminal Appeals remedied that violation by reversing Respondent's conviction and remanding his case for a new trial. (App. p. 2). Such a procedure is clearly an adequate one under Pate v. Robinson, 383

U.S. 375, 378 (1966). There is thus no need for this Court to intervene and fashion a different remedy for the Pate violation in this case.

In the past, this Court has looked with disfavor on retrospective competency hearings. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975). Despite Petitioner's protestations to the contrary, this case would be a particularly difficult one in which to hold a retrospective competency hearing. First, over twenty years have passed since Petitioner was originally tried. It is not reasonable to expect a competent psychologist or psychiatrist to testify as to the mental status of a person that many years ago. Further, Dr. H. Leake McCauley, the doctor who examined Respondent at the time of his trial, is now deceased. Respondent thus no longer has available to him expert testimony from a doctor who saw him at the time of his trial. The proper remedy in this case, therefore, would be to grant Respondent a new trial so that he would have the opportunity to obtain expert testimony on his present competency to stand trial. That is exactly what the Court of Criminal Appeals did.

VII.

A PATE VIOLATION IS NOT BARRED BY THE FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO OBJECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A SEPARATE COMPETENCY HEARING

Petitioner argues that once the issue of incompetence has been made known to the trial court, that it is up to counsel to decide if the competency issue should be tried separately or alongside the issue of guilt or innocence. According to Petitioner, the failure to affirmatively request a separate competency hearing results in the waiver of the right to a separate hearing. This argument, however, ignores the language in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) that places the duty on the trial judge to impanel a jury and hold a hearing. Id. at 385. Counsel cannot, by some tactical choice, waive an accused's right to a separate competency hearing that is adequate to protect the accused's right not to be tried while incompetent. Just as it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly and intelligently waive his right to

have the court determine his capacity to stand trial, it is just as contradictory to argue that an incompetent defendant may waive his right to a constitutionally adequate procedure designed to protect his right not to be tried while incompetent. See, Id. at 384.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas rests on an adequate and independent state ground. Further, Petitioner has failed to show any error on the part of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas that justifies review by this Court. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should accordingly be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the 16th day of September, 1987, a true and correct copy of the Respondent's Brief in Opposition was mailed to Mr. David Chapman, Assistant District Attorney, 200 W. Belknap Street, Fort Worth, Texas 79196-0201.

Robert Udashen

AFFIDAVIT

I, Robert Udashen, hereby certify that on September 16, 1987, I mailed the original and three copies of the Respondent's Brief in Opposition by first class mail, postage prepaid, certified, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States for filing.

Robert Udashen

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me by the above named Affiant this 16th day of September, 1987, to certify which witness my hand and seal of office.

Notary Public in and for
The State of Texas

My commission expires:
4-27-88

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
SEP 30 1987
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

No. 87-284

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

THE STATE OF TEXAS, *Petitioner*

v.

RODNEY GENE BROADWAY, *Respondent*

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Petitioner's Reply to Brief in Opposition

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 1

APPENDIX

Excerpt of Direct Examination of Dr. H. Leake McCauley, Jr., by Hon. Ardell Young A-1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (1986)..... 2, 3, 4
Ex parte Locklin, 583 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)..... 3
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)..... 2, 3

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THE STATE OF TEXAS, *Petitioner*

v.

RODNEY GENE BROADWAY, *Respondent*

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Petitioner's Reply Brief

In his statement of the case and again in his fifth reason for denying the writ, respondent contends that his expert psychiatric witness, Dr. McCauley, did *not* recant his previous testimony about respondent's competency to stand trial. This was in response to petitioner's contention that Dr. McCauley first testified that respondent was not competent but on cross-examination said he was competent. Pet. at 6-7. Respondent's argument is that because Dr. McCauley's cross-examination testimony was in terms relevant to sanity rather than competency, he did not in fact retreat from his testimony on direct that respondent was not competent to stand trial.

What respondent overlooks is that Dr. McCauley's testimony on direct was also in terms relevant only to "sanity." He testified that respondent was "insane" at the time McCauley examined him, "the same" at the time of

the offense, and "the same" at the time of trial. App. 3. Dr. McCauley was then asked if "Broadway *knows* the difference between right and wrong," and he answered, "I don't think he *can apply* these standards to himself." App. 3-4. (Emphasis added.) After stating that he thought respondent was "mentally ill," Dr. McCauley was passed for cross-examination. App. 4.

Respondent should not be allowed to have it both ways. Either the competency issue was raised and recanted, or it was not raised at all and never recanted. Throughout McCauley's testimony he used terminology pertinent to the insanity defense rather than incompetency to stand trial. However, regardless of which way the Court reads McCauley's testimony – whether raising competency and recanting it or not raising it at all – respondent's competency was not at issue, and the absence of a separate hearing was harmless error.

Respondent's first two reasons for denying the writ are premised on his contention that state courts have final authority to decide federal due process issues as long as the remedy chosen by the state court meets or exceeds minimum due process requirements established by this Court. Thus, according to respondent, if the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refuses to hold that error under *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) can be harmless, and thereby grants a criminal defendant significantly greater relief than is constitutionally required by *Pate*, this Court should not review the state court holding.

Respondent's position is at odds with the Supremacy Clause and *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 106 S.Ct. 1431

(1986). In *Van Arsdall*, the Court made it clear that it is this Court which ultimately determines whether a particular federal constitutional error can be harmless. See, 106 S.Ct. at 1434-1435, n. 3. Compare the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall, 106 S.Ct. at 1440-1441. It follows that a state court may not finally decide such an issue. Review should be granted so that respondent's contention to the contrary may be rejected.

Respondent makes a similar contention in his sixth reason for denying the writ. He declares that the state court should be free to order a new trial rather than a retrospective competency hearing once it is established that the competency hearing was not discrete. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals clearly concluded that a new trial was the *exclusive* remedy allowed by *Pate* and the Constitution. *Ex parte Locklin*, 583 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The Texas court was therefore attempting to construe federal constitutional law; it was not merely exercising fact-based discretion. Review of the Texas court's decision is therefore proper.

Respondent's third reason for denying the writ is that a *Pate* violation should never be harmless error. However, in his argument he contends that it is the right not to be tried while incompetent that can never be harmless. That may well be so, but it is not the issue in this case. The true issue is whether one of the judicially-created procedural protections of that right is so significant that its deprivation can never be harmless error. Review should be granted to determine if the depriva-

tion of a separate competency hearing is in that small category of constitutional errors that can never be harmless. See, *Van Arsdall*, 106 S.Ct. at 1437.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

EXCERPT OF DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DR. H. LEAKE McCAULEY, JR., BY HON. ARDELL YOUNG

Q. Now, Doctor, will you tell the jury, and describe in some detail if you will, please, just the type of examination that you made of young Broadway when you examined him?

A. Well, I conducted what we call a psychiatric evaluation of him. That just involves sitting down and talking to him and trying to get some idea of his past and his patterns of behavior and calling upon my fund of professional knowledge about people and so forth to try to the best of my ability to derive some idea of how I feel he is functioning and whether or not he is mentally sick and whether or not he is in need of treatment.

Q. Doctor, just generally speaking, could you tell the jury something of young Broadway's intellectual power or his intelligence? For instance, his IQ, what could you tell the jury about that?

A. Well, I think he is mentally defective.

Q. And why do you say, Doctor, that he is mentally defective?

A. Because based on my interview with him and the way in which he answered my questions and his basic fund of information about what is going on around him, this is my clinical opinion that he is mentally deficient. This is borne out by the psychological reports. It was corroborated, so to speak, by the psychological reports which were given to me.

Q. Did your examination of him disclose any information to you with regard to whether young Broadway had judg-

ment and whether he could exercise proper judgment in any situation?

A. I think he has a very serious lack of judgment.

Q. What about his ability to think abstractly?

A. It is markedly impaired.

Q. What significance, Doctor, is that to you as a psychiatrist, his ability or inability to think abstractly?

A. That means that he cannot properly appraise and assess realistic interpersonal relationships with which he is confronted. His intellectual ability is compromised to a point where he is not able to deal with interpersonal relations with other people in an appropriate way and especially when he is under a great amount of stress and strain and things of this sort.

Q. Did your examination disclose to you any information concerning whether he is a young man of great impulsive nature or whether he is not of an impulsive nature?

A. I think he is very impulsive because of his defective intellect and that he is unable to control his instincts and drives.

Q. Does that or not, Doctor, in your opinion, make him very easy to be led or suggested to?

A. Very definitely. Yes, very definitely. A strong personality would be able to suggest something to this individual, just as a father would tell his little child, let's go outside, and the child would go along.

Q. What about his ability to control his emotions?

A. Markedly impaired.

Q. Doctor, did you also get some of this boy's family and his family background?

A. I did.

Q. Doctor, assume that this boy's mother has been mentally ill and that she herself has been confined in a mental institution at least three times in her lifetime, would that in itself have any relevancy or suggest anything to you?

A. Yes. It would certainly be important enough to be considered.

Q. Doctor, based upon your examination of this young man and the information furnished to you by my co-counsel, Mr. McClane, did you form an opinion as to whether or not young Broadway was on the date of your examination, sane or insane?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What is your opinion with respect to young Broadway on the date of your examination with regard to his sanity?

A. It is my opinion that he is psychiatrically ill and is insane, if we have to use that term.

Q. Doctor, based upon your examination, which was conducted in June of 1966, state what your opinion would be with regard to his mental condition, say on January 13, 1966, some five months before this?

A. It would be my professional opinion that it would be the same.

Q. And what is your professional opinion with regard to his condition right now on this day?

A. Well, of course, I have not seen him since June 14th but it would be my feeling that it would be the same as it was on that date.

Q. Now, Doctor, what is your professional opinion with regard to whether young Broadway knows the difference between right and wrong as applied to himself in his own individual conduct and behavior?

A. I don't think he can apply these standards to himself. I do not think that he can apply what is right and what is wrong to himself, nor does he know the nature and quality of his acts in relation to other people. I mean that as he sits there he knows that it is a table and that you are his lawyer and this is the judge and this and that, but he cannot apply these things to himself, I do not think.

Q. Is he in your opinion mentally ill?

A. Yes.

MR. YOUNG: That is all.